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Building on evidence of increasing inequality with the 2008-9 recession, we ask whether 
households experienced different financial trajectories through the recession depending on initial 
income and net worth.  Using growth curve models of households headed by young adults in the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we compare the relationship between initial income and net 
worth and the rate of change of income and net worth from 1989 to 2011 among households with 
income above and below $50,000.  We find different patterns of income change and different 
relationships among income, net worth, and their rates of change between high- and low-income 
categories.  Results suggest initial wealth helped to stabilize income and wealth changes among 
higher income households, reducing financial insecurity. 
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Thomas Piketty’s (2014) recent bestselling book documents the trajectory of wealth 
inequality over the last century, including its rapid growth in the last four decades.  Other 
research finds a similar pattern of rising inequality of both wealth and income (Frank 2013; 
Harrison and Bluestone 1988; Keister 2000; Morris and Western 1999; Piketty and Saez 2003; 
Sherman and Stone 2010; Wolff 1995, 2006).  Faced with rising economic inequality over the 
last several decades, there is growing concern over economic mobility in the U.S. (Fletcher 
2008).  While in many cases the concern over wealth inequality focuses on children or future 
generations (Conley 2001; Duncan and Murnane 2011; Ermisch et al. 2012; Yeung and Conley 
2008), wealth and income inequality have important consequences for an individual’s 
opportunity and experiences as well as those of his or her children.  For example, as Spilerman 
(2000) points out, social policy prevents low income households from reaping the benefits of 
asset-building programs available to the middle class (e.g., the mortgage deduction).  At the 
same time, social welfare policies provide a disincentive to save by disqualifying families who 
hold “too many” assets from social support such as food stamps (Spilerman 2000).    
 Given that public policy benefits available to families vary widely depending on assets, it 
is likely that wealth in young adulthood has implications for financial standing in later life.  In 
other words, it is likely that wealth begets wealth within the same generation.  While this idea 
that “the rich get richer” is relatively trite, it may not hold in contemporary U.S. society, 
particularly during an economic recession if the wealthy have more to lose than the poor.   
How did income and wealth inequality patterns change with the recent Great Recession 
of 2008-9?  Although most 20th century recessions were associated with rising economic 
inequality, inequality declined with the Great Depression of the 1930s, largely due to later 
equalizing effects of New Deal policies and World War II (Grusky et al. 2011).  Similarly, 
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Piketty (2014) notes that the decline in wealth inequality after the Great Depression was an 
anomaly, related to wars and progressive tax rates.  Consistent with these arguments, research on 
the Great Recession suggests it further increased inequality along a variety of dimensions, 
including income and wealth (Emmons and Noeth 2012; Pfeffer et al. 2013; Shapiro et al. 2013).   
Examining the impact of the recession on wealth, Wolff, Owens, and Burak (2011) find 
particularly strong declines at both the top and bottom of the wealth distribution.  Specifically, 
they find that net worth of the top 50 wealthiest Americans fell by 17% from 2008-2009, while it 
fell 37% among the top 1% wealthiest households (Wolff et al. 2011: 150).  Consistent with this 
finding, Frank (2013) notes that the wealthy lost the most during the Great Recession, narrowing 
inequality, but they also gained more as the economy improved.  These findings suggest the 
wealthy may have experienced more intra-generational wealth mobility than the poor during the 
recession (Pew Research Center 2010).  Intra-generational mobility involves change in financial 
standing (e.g., income, wealth, occupation) during one’s lifetime. 
We ask whether financial standing in young adulthood put households on different 
financial trajectories through the recent economic recession.  Did rich young adults get richer 
even during the economic recession?  Specifically, following households headed by young adults 
in 1989 in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), we use growth curve models to estimate 
whether 2011 household wealth and income outcomes (amount and rate of growth) depend on 
initial financial standing.  In the following sections, we review literature on intra-generational 
wealth and income mobility and on inequality, particularly in relation to the economy.  We then 
discuss our methods and analyses, results, and conclude with implications for income and wealth 





 Research on intra-generational mobility has taken many forms.  One line of research 
sought to distinguish aggregate changes in earnings or occupational standing, due to economic 
growth for example, from individual changes (Featherman and Hauser 1978; Fields and Ok 
1999).  Another area of inquiry estimated the extent to which intra-generational earnings 
mobility represented permanent or temporary change (Gottschalk and Moffitt 2009).  This study 
relates to another question about intra-generational mobility: what factors are associated with 
change in the financial standing of an individual or household?  Macro-level factors – such as 
economic growth, industrial change, or union membership – have been critical to understanding 
large-scale changes in financial standing (e.g., Breen 1997; Western and Rosenfeld 2011), but 
may have difficulty explaining why some individuals gain and others lose in the same context.  
At the individual level, education and work experience have been the most commonly 
investigated factors in literature on intra-generational mobility.  Beginning with Becker (1964) 
and Mincer (1974), economists have worked diligently to approach a causal estimate of the 
returns to education (see Heckman et al. 2006 for a review).   
 Beyond education and work experience, which most strongly relate to earnings from 
work, other factors may play an important role in intra-generational mobility of financial 
standing.  Income from capital, for example, is not necessarily dependent on labor force 
participation or earnings and constitutes a substantial share of the overall income of some 
households.  For example, capital income accounted for 25% of aggregate personal income in 
2012 (Woodward 2013, Table 10).   
Furthermore, net worth represents an important measure of financial standing and 
changes in net worth likely depend on different factors from those related to changes in income.  
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Research has shown that many factors are related to intra-generational change in net worth, 
including health (Zagorsky 2005a), divorce (Zagorsky 2005b), parental assets, investment 
strategies, beliefs about money (Klontz and Britt 2012), and stock market fluctuations.  
According to the adage “the rich get richer,” initial net worth may also be related to intra-
generational mobility.  In fact, current U.S. policies may encourage this pattern by facilitating 
asset growth among the middle and upper classes while dis-incentivizing asset accumulation 
among the poor (Spilerman 2000).  In the U.S., the American dream suggests individuals can 
raise their financial standing through hard work.  If that is the case, then initial income should 
play a limited role in later financial standing and young adults should experience a high degree 
of intra-generational mobility. 
 Unfortunately, relatively little research has explicitly investigated the relationship 
between initial income or net worth and later financial standing, particularly during an economic 
recession, when this relationship may change.  Studies that have investigated the importance of 
initial financial standing find substantial differences by race (Shapiro 2004).  For example,  
Shapiro, Meschede, and Osoro (2013) found that a $1.00 income increase was associated with a 
$5.00 wealth increase among whites, but only a $0.70 increase among African Americans.  That 
is, whites enjoyed a much higher wealth return to income.  Even adjusting for initial wealth 
differences, they found that African Americans experienced an average wealth increase of only 
$4.03 for each dollar increase in income, compared to the $5.00 wealth return among whites.  In 
other words, Shapiro and colleagues found that while initial assets account for much of the 
black-white difference in wealth returns to income, a 20% gap in returns still remained.  These 
findings suggest that both income and wealth may be important for later wealth holdings.  




Inequality and Economic Recessions 
Research documenting trends in intra-generational mobility has suggested that, while it 
increased from the 1970s to the mid-1980s, it remained fairly stable from the mid-1980s to 2004 
(Acs and Zimmerman 2008; Moffitt and Gottschalk 2012).  Economic security, however, has 
been declining since the 1990s and many Americans – particularly younger Americans belonging 
to a racial minority group or with less education – have experienced increased economic 
insecurity with the Great Recession (Hacker et al. 2011).   
As Grusky, Western, and Wimer (2011) pointed out, most 20th century recessions were 
associated with rising inequality, because their effects were largely concentrated among the low-
income and poor.  In contrast, they noted that inequality declined with the Great Depression, 
particularly as a result of the narrowing income gap in 1929, but largely through later equalizing 
effects of New Deal policies and World War II.  Without equalizing policy changes, such as 
those following the Depression, Grusky, Western, and Wimer suggested that the Great Recession 
is unlikely to promote equalization (though in 2011 they noted it was too early to make a 
conclusion about the overall effects of the recession).   
More recent research has suggested the Great Recession further increased inequality 
along a variety of dimensions, including wealth, income, age, race, and education (Emmons and 
Noeth 2012; Pfeffer et al. 2013; Shapiro et al. 2013; Friedline et al. 2014).  For example, using 
PSID data, Pfeffer and colleagues (2013) found that low income and minority households with 
relatively low levels of education lost a higher proportion of their wealth than others.   
In contrast, Wolff, Owens, and Burak (2011) found particularly strong wealth declines at 
both the top and bottom of the wealth distribution.  Specifically, they found that net worth of the 
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top 50 wealthiest Americans fell by 17% from 2008-2009, while it fell 37% among the top 1% 
wealthiest households (Wolff et al. 2011: 150).  Consistent with this finding, Frank (2013) noted 
that the wealthy lost the most during the Great Recession, narrowing inequality, but they also 
gained more as the economy improved.  These findings suggest the wealthy may have 
experienced more intra-generational wealth mobility than the poor during the recession (Pew 
Research Center 2010).   
Among the poor, who hold little wealth, the recession may have generated less wealth 
loss but carried other life-changing effects.  For example, in 2008 29% of respondents said they 
either did not have enough or had just enough money to meet basic expenses, compared to 38% 
in 2010 (Pew Research Center 2010).  Similarly, according to the Pew Research Center (2010), 
31% of respondents from low-income families (below $30,000) reported major changes to the 
way they live because of the recession, compared to 17% among higher income respondents 
($75,000 and above).  Among lower-class Americans, 64% said they are in worse shape now 
than before the recession, compared to 45% of middle-class and 36% of upper-class Americans 
(Pew Research Center 2010).  Low income families were also more likely to have experienced 
job-related hardships and to owe more on their home than it is worth (Pew Research Center 
2010).  Because labor income constitutes a higher proportion of their household income, the 
impact of recessions on labor earnings can be particularly traumatic for the lifestyles of low-
income households.   
High quality research has already documented trends in inequality with the recession 
(e.g., Emmons and Noeth 2012; Pfeffer et al. 2013; Shapiro et al. 2013; Friedline et al. 2014).  
However, little research has investigated whether financial trajectories through the recession 
depended on initial financial standing.  Furthermore, there is little understanding about the 
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reciprocal relationship between initial income and wealth and how that changed with the 
recession.  For example, did initial levels of income and net worth predict the speed of income or 
net worth change during the recession?  Did income or net worth shield households from 
financial instability? 
Economic insecurity peaked in 2009 (Hacker et al. 2011) and economic growth reached 
its trough in the fourth quarter of 2008 (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2014), suggesting 
the Great Recession reached its height around the end of 2008.  We examine financial outcomes 
in 2011, after the worst of the recession but before the economy or the budgets of many 
households had fully recovered (Pew Research Center 2010).  Much like an individual 




In general, evidence suggests the Great Recession carried more drastic consequences for 
the wealth of the rich, but affected the earned income and lifestyles of the poor.  Given this 
pattern, we might expect to find different relationships between initial and later financial 
standing among higher and lower income households.  For example, initial wealth may be 
associated with more rapid wealth change among high income families, because well-off 
families lost more but also gained more as the economy improved (Frank 2013).   
In contrast, initial wealth may be associated with slower income changes for all 
households because it can protect against income losses during the recession (e.g., if a 
comparatively larger proportion of income is from wealth).  As suggested by Shapiro et al. 
(2013), initial income is associated with wealth increases, although this relationship is moderated 
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by race.  We therefore expect initial income to be associated with faster change in wealth, but 
only among higher income households who are better able to save and capitalize on that income.  
Given the greater impact of the recession on incomes among poor families (Pew Research Center 
2010), coupled with stagnant wages (Mishel and Shierholz 2013), we expect to see different 
income patterns and different relationships between income, net worth, and their rates of change 
for high- and low-income households.  
Based on the above review, we make the following hypotheses.   
1) Both initial wealth and income are associated with more rapid wealth change, but only 
among high income households.   
2) Initial wealth is an income buffer and is associated with slower income changes for all 
households. 
3) Income change and the relationships between income, net worth, and their rates of 
change are different for high- and low-income households. 
 
Data and Methods 
We built on evidence of increasing inequality during the recession, complicating the 
conceptualization of change in inequality by asking whether households experienced different 
financial trajectories through the recession depending on initial financial standing.  We used data 
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which began in 1968 with a nationally 
representative sample of more than 18,000 individuals living in 5,000 families.  The survey has 
followed these families since 1968, providing longitudinal data on a variety of measures, 
including income and wealth.  Since 1968, the sample has grown to include approximately 
24,000 individuals and nearly 8,700 families as the original families had children and created 
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new families.  For this study, we included only black and white heads of household, because of 
the small numbers of those belonging to other racial groups in the PSID.  To capture the period 
of life during which individuals earn income, accumulate net worth, and save for retirement – 
and to enable longitudinal analysis – we limited the sample to young household heads, who were 
ages 18 to 44 in 1989.  In 2011, these heads of household were ages 40 to 66, younger than 
traditional retirement age.  With these exclusions, our sample included 3,230 households.  
We measured household income and net worth in 1989, 2003, 2007, and 2011.  We used 
Mplus7 to conduct multi-group (high- and low-income households), multivariate non-linear 
growth model analyses of household income and net worth.  Growth curve models allowed us to 
estimate differences in intra-generational mobility, while controlling for other initial differences.  
Growth curve models were ideal for our purposes because they allowed estimation of between-
household differences in intra-generational (i.e. within-household) financial change.  The model 
was estimated using the robust maximum likelihood estimation procedure, with standard errors 
robust to non-normal data (Yuan and Bentler, 2000), and sampling weights.  The pattern of 
change on income and net worth was non-linear and we therefore estimated an unspecified 
growth model (with 2007 and 2011 time points freely estimated).  Time was measured in 10-year 
increments.  
The PSID provided a continuous time-varying measure of net worth by summing the 
values of various types of assets held in a given year, including a business, checking or savings 
accounts, real estate, stocks, and other assets and subtracting credit card and other debt.  
Throughout the paper, we have used the terms net worth and wealth interchangeably.  Total 
household income was also a continuous measure, which we calculated as the sum of total 
household income from the previous tax year including all taxable income, transfer income, and 
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Social Security income for everyone in the family.  Net worth and income in each year were 
inflated to 2011 values using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
Growth curve analysis relied on the mean and was therefore sensitive to non-normal data.  
We converted income and net worth using the Inverse Hyperbolic Sine (IHS) to adjust for 
skewness.  We used the IHS conversion instead of the natural log because it allows us to 
maintain negative net worth values without restricting the sample or distorting standard errors 
(Pence 2006).  IHS income and net worth were divided by 10,000 for ease of interpretation.  
We adjusted for demographic differences measured in 1989, including family size, 
region, and the following measures for head of household: age, race, gender, education, and 
marital status (all time-invariant measures).  Family size included the number of people in the 
household.  Region was measured using indicators for residence in the Northeast, North Central, 
South, or West regions, with Northeast serving as the reference category in models.  Household 
head’s age was measured in years and, because we limit the sample to black and white household 
heads only, race was an indicator for white.  Gender was an indicator for whether the household 
head was male.  Household head’s education level was measured categorically based on years of 
school completed, identifying those with a high school degree or less (12 years or less), those 
with some college (more than 12 and less than 16 years), and those with a four-year degree or 
more (16 years or higher).  Marital status was an indicator for whether the household head was 
married.  We excluded households missing these demographic measures from the regression 
analysis (approximately 1% of the sample), leaving a total sample size of 3,189 households.    
 Our hypotheses predicted different results for low- and high-income households.  We 
therefore ran a multi-group model, which separately estimated relationships among households 
with 1989 income above or below $50,000, measured in 2011 dollars.  This $50,000 threshold 
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for dividing high and low income households was 217% of the 2011 federal poverty level for a 
household with four people ($23,021).  The 200% of federal poverty level threshold has been 
used as an eligibility cutoff for some federal programs such as the Partners for Healthy Children 
program.  With some exceptions, this federal eligibility cutoff suggests households with a total 
income above $50,000 were unlikely to face severe financial hardship.  In our sample, 1,449 
households fell in the low income category (below $50,000) and 1,740 fell in the high income 
category (above $50,000).   
 
Results 
 We provide descriptive information about the sample in Table 1, which shows that 
compared to high-income households, low-income households were slightly smaller, were less 
likely to be in the Northeast or the West, and were more likely to be in the North Central region 
or the South.  The household heads of low-income households were younger, less educated, and 
less likely to be white, male, or married than the heads of high-income households. 
Table 2 provides mean household income and net worth over time for households with 
income above and below $50,000 in 1989.  Figure 1 illustrates the pattern over time and reveals 
different patterns for high and low income households.  From 1989 to 2003, mean income and 
net worth increased at similar rates by income category.  After 2003, however, while income 
stagnated for low income households, it continued to rise among high income households until 
2007 and then decreased in 2011.  Net worth of both low and high income households remained 
flat from 2003 to 2007, and seems to decrease faster among high income than low income 
households from 2007 to 2011.   
[Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 1 about here] 
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These descriptive patterns, however, did not adjust for demographic differences.  We 
used growth curve models to adjust for differences by family size, region, and household head’s 
age, race, education, gender, and marital status.  Accounting for these measures provided a 
significant improvement in data fit compared to a baseline model without controls (p<0.001).  
Table 3 shows results of the multi-group multivariate growth model, allowing comparison 
between high and low income households.  The model presented had a root mean squared error 
of approximation (RMSEA) of 0.037 and a comparative fit index (CFI) score of 0.962, 
suggesting it fit the data well (Browne and Cudeck 1993; Hu and Bentler 1999).   
[Table 3 about here] 
We first discuss results separately for low- and high-income households and then highlight 
differences between the two groups.   
 
Low-Income Households (below $50,000) 
After accounting for demographic differences, there was significant individual variability 
among low income households in the rates of change of income (s2 = 0.37, z = 9.02, p < .001) 
and net worth (s2 = 2.02, z = 2.88, p < .005).  Thus, while Figure 1 suggests mean income and 
net worth among low-income households remained flat during the recession, there was a great 
deal of variation in the rate of change.  While some low-income households saw substantial 
increases in the pace of income and net worth change, others likely saw decreases.  These results 
fit with media coverage of the Great Recession, which emphasized gaps between those employed 
in winning and losing industries (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012), as well as with research 
documenting changes in net worth with the recession (Friedline et al. 2014).  The results reveal 
that there was a great deal of within-class variation among low income households in rate of 
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income and wealth changes.  While many characteristics were controlled, industry of 
employment or occupational status could have accounted for some of this variation, but a variety 
of other factors could have been important as well.   
Among low-income households, Table 3 shows that initial income negatively predicted 
the rate of change of income (B = -0.53, p<.001) but initial net worth did not.  (Note that growth 
curve models estimated the rate of change rather than simply the direction of change, so we refer 
to estimates of change throughout the results section.  A positive rate of change would indicate 
faster change while a negative rate of change would indicate slower change or greater stability.)  
This suggests those with higher initial income experienced slower rates of income change.  If 
low income households faced an income ceiling, those who had approached that ceiling may 
have had less to gain with additional years of experience or seniority over time.  Households 
earning less in 1989, however, may have had more to gain and experienced faster rates of income 
change over time.   
Consistent with Hughes and Seneca (2010), rate of income change differed by region of 
the country; as shown in Table 3, low-income households in the North Central and Southern 
regions had a significantly lower rate of income change than those in the Northeast.  Older age 
was associated with a significantly lower rate of income change than younger participants, 
consistent with the idea that low income households bumped up against an income ceiling.  
Holding other factors constant, low-income households headed by a white, male, educated or 
married individual had a higher rate of income change than those that were not.  Overall, the 
model in Table 3 explained 46% of the variation in rate of income change.   
Unlike rate of income change, results in Table 3 suggest low-income households 
accumulated net worth at a similar rate regardless of initial income or net worth.  This suggests 
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some factor other than initial income or net worth accounted for rate of wealth change.  For 
example, perhaps wealth change reflected unexpected medical or housing expenses, amount of 
wealth in one’s extended family, timing of parental death, institutional factors, or other 
unobserved characteristic.  Larger families had a significantly lower rate of change in net worth 
than smaller families.  Households headed by males and more educated individuals had a 
significantly higher rate of net worth change than those headed by less educated females.  
Overall, the model in Table 3 explained only 25% of the variability in rate of change of net 
worth.  Compared to an R-squared of 0.46 for rate of income change, this low R-squared 
suggests net worth changes may have been more arbitrary or, at the very least, represented a 
more complex process with explanatory factors for which we do not control.  The growth curve 
analysis also modeled initial income and net worth, showing that they were predicted by many 
demographic variables, including household size, region, and household head’s age, race, sex, 
education, and marital status.  Overall, the model in Table 3 accounted for 20% and 15% of 
variation in initial income and net worth, respectively. 
 
High-Income Households ($50,000 or above) 
Similar to low-income households, high-income households also experienced significant 
variability in the rates of change of income (s2 = 0.17, z = 4.42, p < .001) and net worth (s2 = 
1.88, z = 11.77, p < .001).  Therefore, even among high-income households, there appear to have 
been both winners and losers during the recession. 
Among higher income households, Table 3 shows that neither initial income nor net 
worth significantly predicted the rate of income change.  This suggests that – controlling for 
demographic differences – income changes such as raises or job losses were unrelated to initial 
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income.  Contrary to low-income households, therefore, among high-income households, those 
making relatively less did not experience faster rates of change.  Whereas family size did not 
predict rate of income change among low-income households, in higher income households 
Table 3 shows that larger families had a significantly faster rate of income change than smaller 
families.  Those in the South had a significantly lower rate of change in income than those in the 
Northeast.  Age of household head was associated with a significantly lower rate of income 
change and households headed by whites and males had a significantly higher rate of income 
change than those headed by African Americans or females.  Thus, there were significant 
differences in pace of income change along multiple demographic dimensions.  Overall, 35% of 
the variability in rate of income change was explained.  
Contrary to low-income households, rate of net worth change depended significantly on 
both initial income and net worth.  However, as shown in Table 3, initial income was associated 
with faster net worth change while initial net worth was associated with slower change in net 
worth.  Among high earners, therefore, those making more in 1989 saw more rapid changes in 
wealth than those with relatively lower initial incomes.  Higher income households could have 
saved at a more rapid pace, for example, or may have had more income and therefore net worth 
tied up in stock options of their employer (a single company), allowing their net worth to change 
more rapidly than those with lower initial incomes.  In contrast to the higher rate of change 
associated with income, households with higher initial net worth saw significantly lower rates of 
net worth change.  During this period, therefore, it seems that initial wealth provided greater 
stability in net worth.  These findings were somewhat consistent with Hypothesis 1.  While we 
found that higher income was associated with faster change in net worth among high-income 
households, the direction was reversed for initial net worth.  Thus, contrary to showing faster 
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change in net worth because they had the most wealth to lose, those with higher initial net worth 
showed slower net worth change. 
Beyond initial income and net worth, the results in Table 3 suggest older participants had 
a significantly lower rate of change of net worth than younger participants.  Households in the 
West had a significantly higher rate of change of net worth than those in the Northeast. 
Households headed by white, male, and educated individuals had a significantly higher rate of 
change of net worth than those headed by African Americans, females, and the less educated.  
Overall, the model in Table 3 explained 44% of the variability in rate of net worth change.  
Similar to lower income households, the initial income and net worth of higher income 
households were also significantly related to many demographic variables, including household 
size, region, and household head’s age, race, education, and marital status.  Overall, the model 
explained more of the variation in initial income (30%) and net worth (27%) among high income 
households than among low income households. 
 
Differences between Low- and High-Income Households 
We found important differences in the growth of income and net worth between high- 
and low-income households.  Overall, the parameter estimates differed significantly between 
low- and high-income households (χ2(44) = 284.28, p <.001).  Specifically, comparing the 
coefficients predicting change in income, Table 3 shows that those for initial income and net 
worth differed significantly between the two income groups.  Thus, while the relationship 
between income growth rate and initial income was negative among low-income households, it 
was positive (though not significant) and significantly different among high-income households.  
While we cannot be sure, this could reflect less room to increase income among low-income 
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households, possibly due to long-term labor market trends such as deindustrialization and union 
decline (Western and Rosenfeld 2011).  Alternatively, it could reflect that many wage earners are 
paid by the hour and have a limited number of hours available each week.  Among low-income 
households, if those with relatively higher incomes were working all of their waking hours to 
begin with, they may have been unable to raise their income by working more hours.  This 
earnings constraint may have been especially salient during and after the recession, as many 
employers restricted hours offered to reduce costs or to avoid triggering expectations within the 
regulations of the Affordable Care Act (e.g., Trumbull 2013).  In each of these scenarios, the 
difference would reflect a structural income limit faced by households who earned their income 
through labor, but not by households whose income relied more on investments or capital 
income.  Regardless of the explanation, however, the difference was consistent with Hypothesis 
3, predicting that patterns of income change differed for low- and high-income households.   
Although the relationship between income change and initial net worth was not 
significant for either high-income or low-income households, there was a significant difference 
between the two estimates: positive for low-income and negative for high-income households.  
This suggests net worth may have helped to stabilize household income more at the upper end of 
the income distribution.  Contrary to Hypothesis 2, therefore, initial net worth did not 
significantly reduce income change in either income category, but did buffer higher income 
households from income change more than lower income households. 
While there were significant differences for changes in income, the dependence of net 
worth change on initial income or net worth did not differ significantly by income category.  
Thus, the regression results in Table 3 were consistent with Hypothesis 3.  The relationships 
between income, net worth, and their rates of change were different for high- and low-income 
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households.  In addition, there were significant class differences in the relationship between 
financial change and a number of demographic variables.  For example, compared to low-income 
households, age was more strongly associated with slower income change and males had even 
faster income change among high-income households.  When predicting change in net worth, 
age was associated with a lower rate of net worth change in high- but not low-income households 
and this difference was significant (p<.001).  Being married had a significantly stronger 
relationship with net worth change in high-income than in low-income households.  
 To revisit the hypotheses, we found evidence somewhat consistent with Hypothesis 1, 
contradictory to Hypothesis 2, and consistent with Hypothesis 3.  Initial income was associated 
with more rapid wealth change among high-, but not low-income households.  Initial wealth, 
however, was associated with slower changes in wealth in high-income households.  Initial 
wealth was not associated with slower income changes for all households, but did buffer higher 
income households more from income change than lower income households.  Finally, patterns 
of income change and the relationships between income, net worth, and their rates of change 
were different for high- and low-income households. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Further supporting these different patterns and consistent with Hypothesis 3, Figure 2 
shows separate path diagrams of the relationships among initial income, initial net worth, and 
their rates of change by income category.   The diagrams highlight differences between those in 
the high and low income categories, which may not stand out in the table format.  For example, 
in higher income households, rate of net worth change significantly depended on both initial net 
worth and income, but that was not the case in lower income households.  For low-income 
households, initial income and net worth were relatively unimportant for rate of change in net 
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worth.  Rate of income change significantly depended on initial income among lower income but 
not higher income households.  Finally, the association between initial net worth and initial 
income was stronger among high-income households. 
 
Conclusion 
Building on evidence of increasing inequality during the recent recession (Emmons and 
Noeth 2012; Pfeffer et al. 2013), we ask whether households experienced different financial 
trajectories through the recession depending on initial financial standing.  Using growth curve 
analyses of PSID data, we compare income and net worth trajectories from 1989 to 2011 of 
households with income above and below $50,000.  We do not find that the rich got richer 
during the recession.  However, results suggest significant variation, different patterns of change 
in financial standing, and different relationships among income, net worth, and their rates of 
change between high- and low-income categories. 
Several limitations suggest the need for further research.  For example, although we limit 
the sample to households headed by young adults (ages 18-44 in 1989), this still includes a 
relatively wide age range.  We control for age, but that may not fully account for age differences.  
Future research could secure a large enough sample of household heads within a narrow age 
range to allow replication of these analyses while fully accounting for age differences.  Our 
growth curve models control for initial income and wealth and estimate changes in those 
financial standing measures.  Our methods, which estimate within-household change, therefore 
help address potential concerns about age or other between-household differences.   
A second limitation is that, although we document household financial trajectories 
leading up to and through the recession, our analyses do not identify causal effects of the 
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recession.  Identifying patterns of change in household income and net worth is important, and 
can inform policymakers about the characteristics of households that may face greater risk or 
insecurity in future recessions, for example.  To understand the effect of the recent recession on 
particular households, however, would require causal inference techniques not employed here.  
An additional limitation is that we cannot conclusively explain our findings.  We offer potential 
explanations, given the context and what is already known about the time period, but establishing 
conclusive explanations is beyond the scope of this paper.  Future research could attempt to 
establish conclusive explanations.   
Despite these limitations, our results offer useful information about household change in 
income and net worth.  For example, given the significant variation we find for both high- and 
low-income groups, it appears there were winners and losers among both high- and low-income 
households during the Great Recession.  This supports existing arguments that emphasize 
unequal effects of the recession by industry of employment and other factors (U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2012; Friedline et al. 2014; Prawitz et al. 2013; Stein et al. 2013).  Whether due 
to industry of employment or other reasons, therefore, our results suggest households may 
experience a recession very differently.  In future recessions, policymakers could work to target 
support toward households most negatively affected.  By targeting the households most affected, 
policymakers could minimize the negative effects of financial stress on children, adolescents, 
and families, ranging from food insecurity, alcohol or substance use, and depression, to partner 
relationship strain (Chang et al. 2014; Romo 2014; Serido et al. 2014; Stein et al. 2013).  
Evidence suggests that even small amounts of emergency savings can help reduce the extent and 
negative consequences of economic hardship (Gjertson forthcoming).  
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Results are consistent with the idea that low-income households face a ceiling on what 
they can earn.  Although we certainly cannot identify it definitively, such a ceiling would mean 
that while experience and seniority may improve income among those at the bottom of the 
income distribution within a particular field of employment, those at the top (of the low-income 
category) may cease to experience any income gains over time beyond a certain level.   
Contrary to rate of income change, results suggest low-income households accumulate 
net worth at a similar rate regardless of initial income.  This is relatively promising, suggesting 
low-income households earning less than others in their income category have a similar potential 
for asset accumulation as those earning more.  Policymakers could use this information to help 
low-income households build net worth to weather future recessions.  By targeting all low-
income households, for example, policymakers could efficiently incentivize saving or 
investment. 
At the same time, we find that initial income is associated with more rapid wealth change 
among high-income, but not low-income households.  This finding suggests that income carries 
less potential for intra-generational wealth mobility among low-income households.  This could 
reflect a number of factors, including the ability of higher income households to save more 
quickly or limited diversity in investment, which could increase variability of wealth among high 
income households.  Regardless of the explanation, however, this difference suggests 
policymakers aiming to increase intra-generational wealth mobility may have to develop wealth-
building strategies targeted at low-income households. 
Contrary to initial income, initial wealth is associated with slower income changes among 
high-income households.  Thus, it appears that wealth helped to buffer higher income households 
from income change during the recession but did not play the same role among lower income 
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households.  This suggests net worth may play a more stabilizing role in the income of investors 
than wage earners.  Once again, we can only speculate, but it might have to do with the types of 
assets that low-income households are more likely to hold.  That is, low-income households are 
more likely to hold the bulk of their wealth in a home, which is more difficult to turn into income 
and which was particularly vulnerable to devaluation in the recent recession.  Households with 
higher incomes and wealth, in contrast, are more likely to have greater income and asset 
diversity – in stocks, dividends, and other income generating assets (Mishel et al. 2013).  If 
policymakers want to minimize the income shocks of future recessions, therefore, they may need 
to help low-income households build both assets and the diversity of those assets.   
Overall, we find different patterns of income change and different relationships between 
income, net worth, and their rates of change for high- and low-income households.  Thus, 
although neither income category passed through the recession unscathed, results suggest the 
income and net worth trajectories of young adult households depend on initial financial standing.  
Although the rich did not get richer during the recession, they did enjoy greater financial 
security.  Among higher income households, those holding more wealth in 1989 experienced 
lower rates of net worth change.  Wealth provided greater economic security.  Among lower 
income households, wealth did not lower rates of income or wealth change, but those with higher 
initial incomes experienced lower rates of income change.  While the form of capital differs by 
income category, results suggest those with higher initial financial standing experienced less 
financial insecurity with the Great Recession.  These findings suggest lower income households 
may need assistance during economic recessions to reduce financial insecurity. At the same time, 
however, results suggest low-income households are able to accumulate assets.  Policies could 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Household Income Category in 1989 





    Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 






  Northeast 0.14 0.35 0.27 0.45 
  North Central 0.34 0.47 0.27 0.44 
  South 0.38 0.49 0.24 0.43 
  West 0.14 0.35 0.22 0.41 





  Age 28.72 5.89 32.38 5.57 
  White 0.75 0.43 0.93 0.25 
  Male 0.79 0.41 0.91 0.28 
  High School or Less 0.51 0.50 0.20 0.40 
  Some College 0.34 0.47 0.35 0.48 
  4-Years of College or More 0.16 0.37 0.45 0.50 
  Married 0.70 0.46 0.90 0.30 
N  1449   1740   








Table 2: Mean Household Income and Net Worth over Time by 1989 Income Category 
Household Income Category 1989 2003 2007 2011 
Low Household Income  Income $30,683 $78,458 $78,196 $81,009 
(<$50,000) Net Worth $27,961 $175,559 $159,633 $177,120 
High Household Income  Income $95,777 $138,053 $152,567 $141,680 
 (≥$50,000) Net Worth $174,269 $608,987 $651,075 $602,298 
Source: weighted PSID. Sample consists of adults 18-44 in 1989 and 40-66 in 2011.  





Table 3. Regression Coefficients of Multi-Group Multivariate Growth Model 
 
 
Low-Income (< $50,000) High-Income (≥ $50,000) 
  DV IV B β p R2 B β p R2 χ2 p 
Rate of change  
Income 
   
0.457 
   
0.353 
   Initial income -0.53 -0.53 <0.001 
 
0.19 0.22 0.424 
 
18.80 <0.001 
 Initial net worth 0.03 0.05 0.477 
 
-0.04 -0.20 0.193 
 
11.94 0.001 
 Family size -0.03 -0.05 0.225 
 
0.07 0.20 <0.001 
 
15.03 <0.001 
 Region (vs. Northeast)           
 North Central -0.25 -0.15 0.004 
 
-0.10 -0.09 0.074 
 
3.22 0.073 
 South -0.21 -0.13 0.019 
 
-0.16 -0.14 0.006 
 
0.62 0.431 
 West 0.00 0.00 0.973 
 
0.11 0.09 0.099 
 
0.26 0.607 
 Age -0.02 -0.17 <0.001 
 
-0.03 -0.29 <0.001 
 
7.08 0.008 
 Race 0.14 0.07 0.042 
 
0.37 0.18 <0.001 
 
3.42 0.065 
 Sex 0.32 0.16 0.001 
 
0.54 0.30 <0.001 
 
11.09 0.001 
 Education 0.18 0.33 <0.001 
 
0.06 0.17 0.072 
 
0.16 0.691 
 Marital status 0.23 0.13 0.012 
 




           Rate of change 
Net worth 
   
0.250 
   
0.443 
   Initial income -0.44 -0.22 0.317 
 
0.99 0.32 0.008 
 
2.95 0.086 
 Initial net worth 0.05 0.05 0.934 
 
-0.45 -0.64 <0.001 
 
1.44 0.230 
 Family size -0.20 -0.18 0.007 
 
0.00 0.00 0.988 
 
2.50 0.114 
 Region (vs. Northeast)           
 North Central 0.24 0.07 0.388 
 
0.06 0.01 0.705 
 
0.75 0.387 
 South 0.19 0.06 0.506 
 
-0.16 -0.04 0.372 
 
1.77 0.183 
 West 0.39 0.08 0.340 
 
0.49 0.11 0.004 
 
2.66 0.103 
 Age 0.01 0.02 0.845 
 
-0.06 -0.19 <0.001 
 
15.41 <0.001 
 Race 0.24 0.06 0.331 
 
0.76 0.10 0.002 
 
2.91 0.088 
 Sex 0.74 0.19 0.045 
 
0.91 0.14 0.001 
 
0.27 0.607 
 Education 0.28 0.27 <0.001 
 
0.16 0.12 0.009 
 
0.02 0.877 
 Marital status 0.29 0.08 0.333 
 




           Initial income 
   
0.204 
   
0.301 
   Family size 0.05 0.10 0.015 
 
-0.05 -0.11 0.014 
 
15.43 <0.001 
 Region (vs. Northeast)           
 North Central -0.23 -0.13 0.021 
 
-0.17 -0.13 0.010 
 
1.19 0.276 
 South -0.05 -0.03 0.648 
 
-0.17 -0.13 0.009 
 
0.09 0.768 
 West -0.11 -0.05 0.328 
 
-0.19 -0.14 0.006 
 
0.90 0.343 
 Age 0.03 0.19 <0.001 
 
0.03 0.32 <0.001 
 
1.14 0.285 
 Race 0.24 0.13 0.004 
 
0.04 0.02 0.599 
 
6.10 0.014 
 Sex 0.36 0.18 <0.001 
 
0.11 0.05 0.212 
 
13.89 <0.001 
 Education 0.04 0.08 0.029 
 
0.15 0.35 0.000 
 
11.75 0.001 
 Marital status 0.35 0.20 <0.001 
 




           
30 
 
Initial net worth 
   
0.148 
   
0.266 
   Family size 0.11 0.12 0.048 
 
-0.08 -0.04 0.286 
 
0.72 0.397 
 Region (vs. Northeast)           
 North Central -0.47 -0.16 0.037 
 
-0.97 -0.17 <0.001 
 
0.73 0.394 
 South -0.36 -0.13 0.115 
 
-1.17 -0.19 <0.001 
 
7.40 0.007 
 West -0.47 -0.12 0.087 
 
-0.60 -0.10 0.017 
 
3.80 0.051 
 Age 0.05 0.22 <0.001 
 
0.21 0.45 <0.001 
 
8.71 0.003 
 Race 0.42 0.13 0.015 
 
0.95 0.09 <0.001 
 
9.15 0.002 
 Sex 0.71 0.21 0.001 
 
0.46 0.05 0.152 
 
4.59 0.032 
 Education 0.07 0.08 0.200 
 
0.15 0.08 0.025 
 
1.73 0.189 
 Marital status -0.09 -0.03 0.669 
 
0.93 0.11 0.003 
 
26.43 <0.001 
N  1,449    1,740    3,189  
Source: PSID. Sample consists of adults 18-44 in 1989 and 40-66 in 2011. All numbers are rounded.  






Figure 1: Mean Household Income and Net Worth over Time by 1989 Income Category 
 
Source: weighted PSID.  
<$50k = household income in 1989 less than $50,000 (N = 1,449) 


















Figure 2: Multivariate Growth Model for Low- and High-Income Households 












R2 = .250R2 = .148
R2 = .204 R2 = .457
 
 












R2 = .443R2 = .266
R2 = .301 R2 = .353
 
 
Path diagrams illustrate the growth curve model in Table 3. 
Source: PSID. Sample consists of adults 18-44 in 1989 and 40-66 in 2011. All numbers are rounded. (N = 3,189) 
* p < .05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001. 
 
